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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICSGender as an Impediment to Labor Market Success:





Compared to older women, young female job seekers are more than three times as likely to report
that their ability to find a good new job is compromised by the simple fact that they are female. Why
is this?  In this paper we show, first, that young women’s more frequent reports of gender-induced
harm cannot be statistically attributed to any observed personal or job characteristics, or  to any
“objective” measure of discrimination computable in our data.  Second, using new questions asked
in a Canadian survey, we note that women’s reports of gender-induced advantage, as well as men’s
reports of gender-induced harm, are also more prevalent among the young.  Using a formal model
of the reporting decision, we conclude that the most likely cause of all these phenomena is a
particular kind of age difference in reporting behavior: young people of both sexes are more likely
than older people to interpret departures in either direction from gender-neutral treatment as causally
affected by their gender.  This may have important implications for future public support of
antidiscrimination policies, and for the design of those policies.  
The authors would like to thank Human Resources Development Canada for making the data for this
study available, and the Canadian International Labour Network (CILN) for financial support.  CILN
receives major funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and
McMaster University.  Felice Martinello and David Robinson provided helpful comments.While econometric evidence of wage gaps is becoming increasingly accepted in many Courts, evidence of
1
specific incidents of discriminatory treatment –which may or may not be reflected in wage measures-- is still seen as
stronger support for a claim of discrimination in almost all cases.  See Kuhn (1987) for a discussion.  
I. Introduction.
In a number of recent papers (Kuhn (1987, 1990); Barbezat and Hughes (1990); Heywood
(1992); Hampton and Heywood (1993, 1996); Laband and Lentz (1993, 1998); Johnson and
Neumark (1997)) labor economists have begun to analyze aspects of labor market discrimination
that, unlike more standard “residual wage gap” measures (Oaxaca 1973), are directly derived
from survey reports of discriminatory treatment.  Survey reports of discrimination can be of
interest to economists for a number of reasons, including as a check on the validity of these
traditional “wage gap” measures, or as objects of interest in their own right.  For a number of
issues, including public support for antidiscrimination policies, and the prevalence of the kind of
discriminatory treatment that may be remediable in courts of law , survey reports of
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discrimination might be more directly relevant than wage gap measures. 
A common, but often overlooked finding in the literature on survey reports of
discrimination is a greater tendency for younger women to feel harmed by discrimination than
older women (see for example Kuhn (1987) and Laband and Lentz (1998)).  Does this mean that
young women face particular gender-related problems that old women do not?  Perhaps more
importantly, might it indicate an increasing level of discrimination, of a kind not usually
measured, against new cohorts of women?  If so, this age pattern might be a cause for some
concern.  The goal of this paper is to shed some light on this phenomenon, using a new survey of
Canadian job seekers with extensive information on both labor market outcomes and perceptions
of gender-related harm. 2
We begin our analysis by establishing that women’s reports of experiencing gender-
induced harm in the labor market are indeed more frequent among the young:  In our data, female
job seekers aged 15-24 are more than three times as likely to say they have been hurt by their
gender in the labor market than those aged 55-64.  We then assess various possible explanations
of this phenomenon in turn.  We show, first, that higher reports of harm among young women
cannot be explained by any measured personal or job characteristics in our sample.  Second,
these reports cannot be explained by any standard measures of “objective” discrimination that
have been used by economists: in our sample measured discrimination on all dimensions
considered is lower among young women.  
Third, using the extra information in the current survey on women’s perceptions of
gender-induced advantage, and on men’s perceptions of gender-induced harm, we also rule out a
higher mean level of  unmeasured discrimination against young women as a possible
explanation.    The reason for this is, perhaps surprisingly, that women’s reports of gender-
induced advantage, and men’s reports of perceived harm, are also higher among younger than
among older job seekers.  Clearly, these patterns cannot be explained by a higher overall level of
discrimination against young women, even of a form that is not captured by standard
discrimination measures. 
Finally, we estimate a formal model of the decision to report gender-induced advantage or
harm that allows us to test two further explanations of the above patterns.  One of these --greater
dispersion in the labor market experiences of young workers-- receives mixed support.  The other
--a particular difference in reporting behavior-- receives more consistent support, and is our
preferred explanation for the patterns observed.   According to this interpretation, young workers3
of both sexes are simply more willing to label departures from gender-neutral treatment in either
direction as being caused by their gender.  In this sense, young workers are less “tolerant” of both
traditional and reverse discrimination, a phenomenon which might pose a challenge for the
design of future antidiscrimination policy. 
Section II describes the data used in this study.  Section III presents our main results
concerning women’s reports of gender-induced harm.  Section IV broadens the analysis to
include women’s reports of gender-induced advantage, and men’s reports of harm, and estimates
our formal model of reporting.  Section V concludes. 
II. Data.
The data used in our analysis is a nationally representative sample of Canadians who have
recently experienced a job separation:  the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP). 
Individuals separating from jobs in two window periods during 1995 were identified using
administrative records of the Unemployment Insurance system, which requires employers to file
a “Record of Employment” (ROE) form whenever a separation occurs.  The data contain a rich
set of measures about a worker’s pre-separation job, his or her first post-separation job, the (post-
separation) job at the time of the interview, as well as on unemployment spells; our analysis
focuses on the actual and perceived outcomes of these workers’ search for a new job.  Unlike
some other studies of discrimination, the current study thus focuses particularly on actual and
perceived discrimination in access to jobs, rather than, for example, discrimination within jobs. 
This is useful, in our view, because it is widely accepted that the former issue of access to jobs,
rather than the latter, plays the central role in explaining male-female wage gaps today (see for4
The focus on job seekers also serves to eliminate a potential explanation of the age difference in reports
2
suggested in Kuhn (1987): the notion that young women might have had less of a chance to locate a nondiscriminatory
employer than older women.  In the current data, women of all ages are engaged in the search for a new job, yet we
continue to see the patterns found in nationally-representative surveys of reported discrimination. 
In Cohort 2 the question on perceived harm was only asked of people who, at the survey date, were still
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searching for a job. To the extent that these individuals are still searching because they have had disappointing search
outcomes, or because they can afford to search longer than others, they will be systematically different from the
population of all job separations. 
In some of what follows we analyse the unemployment durations of the individuals in our sample.  When we
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do so our sample is further restricted to individuals who lost their job due to a layoff, and who reported that they
engaged in at least some search for a new job after the layoff.  See  Section 3, footnote 10. 
example Johnson and Solon 1986).
2
Because of a problem with how reports of gender-induced harm were measured, in this
paper we only use the information from separations in the first window of the 1995 COEP
survey, which consists of 3898 individuals.   Eliminating individuals who were 65 years of age or
3
over left us with a sample of 1586 women and 2280 men.  Descriptive statistics on the main
variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 1.   Inspection of Table 1 reveals that, on
average, women in our sample are slightly older than men, but have about 10 weeks less tenure
on their preseparation jobs.  Further, women are more likely to have education at the higher
levels (college and university) compared to the men in our sample.  Not surprisingly, women are
much more likely to be in highly feminized occupations, though they do not differ markedly from
men in their marital status distribution and presence of children.  Turning to labor market
“outcome” variables, Table 1 shows that the mean hourly pre-separation wages of men and
women are $15.72 and $10.09, respectively.  Thus, women earn 64% of what men do before the
separation.  A slightly smaller earnings ratio (61%) is found for post-separation wages.  In our
sample of unemployment durations, women had been unemployed about 3 weeks longer than
men as of the survey date, which was usually about 30 weeks after the separation.
45
It may be objected that this question does not include the word discrimination.  Although this is true, the age
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patterns of reported “discrimination” in our study are similar to a number of other studies (e.g. Laband and Lentz 1998),
increasing our confidence that they capture the same phenomenon.
Finally, the measure of gender-induced harm in the current paper is based on the
following question:  “In any of the job search that you have done since [the separation date], do
you feel that your gender has had an impact on your ability to find a good job?”  To avoid
framing the question in a way that might encourage responses in either direction, the allowed
responses were (1) yes, hurt; (2) yes, helped; or (3) no impact.  In cohort one, which forms the
basis of our sample, the question was asked of all individuals, irrespective of gender, and
irrespective of their employment status at the time of the interview.  For brevity in what follows,
we occasionally refer to this as the “reported discrimination” question; to individuals choosing
the “yes, hurt” response as experiencing “hurtful discrimination”; and to those indicating “yes,
helped” as experiencing “helpful discrimination”, i.e. being a beneficiary of labor market
discrimination.   
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According to Table 1, about 14 percent of women, and 11 percent of men experiencing a
job separation report that their gender had some effect on their ability to find a  good new job,
with the balance --a vast majority of both men and women-- indicating they felt their gender had
no effect. Among those who reported advantage or harm, women were more likely to feel that
they were hurt than helped, by a ratio of about 10 to 4, while men's reports were almost evenly
split between those who were hurt or helped.  Thus, while hurtful discrimination against women
is the most common way in which gender is perceived to affect search outcomes, other forms of
perceived gender-induced harm or advantage also play substantial roles in our sample. 6
Percent female was calculated for the 19 occupations coded in the COEP survey from a nationally
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representative sample of workers in the 1994 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).  Like all the right-hand-side
variables used here, this refers to the preseparation job to avoid endogeneity.  The correct interpretation, is, we believe,
that women with previous jobs in highly-feminized occupations are likely to have skills that are specific to such
occupations.  Their search activity is therefore more likely to focus on those  kinds of jobs. 
III.  Women’s Reports of Gender-Induced Harm.
Table 2 shows the fraction of women reporting gender-induced harm in five age
categories.   As in Kuhn (1987), it is clear that women's reports of hurtful discrimination are
highest among the young: in the present case they are more than three times as frequent among
women under 25, at 13.2 percent of the sample, than among women aged 55-64, at 4.3 percent.
This difference is the main stylized “fact” we analyze in this paper, and echoes earlier findings in
Kuhn (1987) and others.   
Can young women’s more frequent reports of gender-induced harm be explained by
differences in observed characteristics between them and older women?  To answer this question
we first estimate a probit model of hurtful discrimination on age only.    We then add observed
covariates, to see if, under any specification, the direct effect of age is substantially reduced in
magnitude.  Before discussing our results, it is worth commenting on the role of one particular
variable included in these regresions:  the gender composition of one’s occupation.    We
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included this variable to capture what we initially considered a very appealing explanation for the
pattern observed in our data:  Perhaps young women are more likely to be “pioneers”:  i.e. to be
among the first women to enter high-paying, formerly all-male occupations like law, science,
medicine and management.  High levels of reported discrimination could occur because these
workplaces had not yet adapted themselves to women’s presence and because of lingering sexist
attitudes; this could be consistent, as noted below, with low levels of measured discrimination7
A formal version of the “pioneers” hypothesis can be found in Kuhn (1993). In that model, binding entry
7
restrictions against women seeking access to jobs “designed” for men become more likely as women’s labor force
attachment becomes more similar to men’s, and as the gender-wage gap consequently narrows.  (The intuition is that
women will not want those jobs until they become sufficiently committed to the work force).  Thus, to the extent that
wanting a traditionally “male” job but being denied entry to it is a kind of discrimination, this kind of discrimination
will (a) not be captured by standard wage-gap measures, and (b) be most common among those groups of women (e.g.
younger cohorts) who are most committed to the labor market and face the smallest measured wage gaps. 
because these are high-paying occupations for women.   
7
Table 3 presents estimates of various specifications of a probit for reported gender-
induced harm.  The following results are of note.  Although the age coefficient does tend to
decline in significance as controls are added, it remains negative and of roughly the same
magnitude no matter what the specification.  The only other variables that affect reports of
hurtful discrimination are the percent female in one's occupation, and perhaps marital status. 
Percent female does have the effect anticipated on reports:  women who are a minority in their
occupations (low values of percent female) are much more likely to report encountering hurtful
discrimination in their search for a new job, perhaps simply because they are more likely to be
interacting with, and competing with men in the job search process.  Importantly, however, this
does not help explain the age pattern in reports in our data:  adding the percent female variable
has essentially no effect on the estimated age effect on reported harm.  The reason is that, in our
data, age and percent female are hardly related: while “pioneers” do run into more barriers,
apparently women of all age groups have their share of pioneers.  
We conclude from Table 3 that, while some of the observable characteristics of women in
our sample have interesting and potentially important effects on women’s reports of gender-
induced harm, none of these other characteristics is able to account for the observed effect of age

























 Most plausibly, we would probably expect reported discrimination during the job search interval to be related
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to the quality of the job that was ultimately found (i.e. the postseparation wage) and the length of time required to find
it (unemployment duration).  However it is also possible that the frequency of discriminatory treatment encountered by
a  population subgroup (e.g. young women) can have equilibrium effects on the wages or unemployment durations of
all members of the group (for example via a lower reservation wage the search for the preseparation as well as the
postseparation job).  If it does, then the preseparation wage --which has the advantage of being observed for
substantially more individuals in our data-- should also give an indication of the distribution of discrimination across
broad population subgroups.  
 In our analysis we also looked at two other outcomes: wage differences between the pre- and post-separation
9
jobs, and reported reservation wages.  Consistent with our prior that the amount of discrimination is a relatively
permanent characteristic of the market for workers of a given age, wage differences were unrelated to age, while
reservation wages followed the same pattern as pre- and post-separation wage levels.  Thus neither of these are able to
explain the age pattern in reports either. 
frequent reports of hurtful discrimination:  higher levels of measured labor market discrimination
against them.  To examine this hypothesis, we first compute individual-specific measures of
discrimination for three labor market outcomes --post-separation wages, pre-separation wages,
and unemployment durations, as follows.    We compute three alternative measures because,
8
especially in this sample of job searchers, there may be a number of plausible ways in which
women are affected by discrimination, and we want to be sure that no plausible channel by which
measured discrimination patterns might explain the age pattern in reports is overlooked.  
9
For the case of wage discrimination, we compute our measure of “objective”







































More commonly, discrimination measures have been computed as a predicted log wage difference for an
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“average” woman in the sample (Oaxaca, 1973).  The measures used here simply apply Oaxaca’s decomposition to each
individual woman in the sample (see Kuhn 1987).
where F stands for female, M stands for male, w and w  are individual log wages, and X  is a ii i j
F M
vector of ones for j=0.  We then use the estimated coefficients from equations (1) and (2) to





Conceptually, both the above definitions of discrimination can be thought of the (log) difference
between what a specific woman actually earns and what she would earn “if she were a man”. The
difference between the two concerns the definition of the counterfactual:    implicitly
compares a woman to a man with both her observed characteristics and unobserved ability (thus
the earnings function residual drops out of the expression);    compares a woman’s actual
earnings to a man with her observed characteristics of “average” unobserved ability.   Because,
even controlling for measurable characteristics, men tend to earn more than women, we expect
the majority of individual  ’s , according to either measure, in our sample to be positive. 




We determined who was actively involved in search based on two questions in the COEP survey: “Did you
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look for work between the separation date and the first job [you held since the separation]?” (only asked of people who
had a first job), and “Did you look for work between the separation date and [the survey date]?” (only asked of people
who had no jobs since the separation).  If the answer was no to either of these questions, the respondents were dropped
from the sample.
Percent female is not included in the calculation of measured discrimination because we adopt the view that
12
women’s concentration in highly-feminized occupations is an outcome of discrimination.  That said, the results do not
differ markedly when it is included. 
wage measures as possible, given the nature of our data.  We first estimate male and female log
duration regressions in a manner strictly parallel to (1) and (2), using a censored-normal model to
account for incomplete spells.  Unlike the wage regressions, however, this regression was
restricted to individuals who lost their job due to a layoff and who engaged in at least some job
search after the separation.   Because longer durations are worse labor market outcomes than
11
shorter ones, our estimates of discrimination are then the negatives of (3) and (4).  The measure, 
,  that relies on actual individual durations is treated as missing for individuals whose
durations are censored. 
In Table 4, we present unadjusted means of the three different labor market outcomes,
and of individual-specific discrimination measures based on each outcome, for women in
different age categories.  In all the regressions underlying Table 4, the following variables are
included in the X ’s: age, education, region, marital status, number of children less than six years ij
of age, and tenure on the preseparation job.   Two immediately apparent features of Table 4 are
12
the similarity of the patterns in unadjusted versus regression-adjusted wage gaps, and the
similarity of patterns for pre- and post-separation wages.  In one sense, neither of these should be
surprising: measured discrimination is a relatively permanent characteristic of the labor market









differ little) is largely driven by gender differences in the unadjusted wage gap.   Further, unlike
survey reports of discrimination, all three estimates of “objective” discrimination against women
are lower among young workers, though the patterns are stronger and more consistent for wages
than unemployment spells.  (There is also an exception for the youngest age category when wage
discrimination is calculated using  ).  Although we explore these issues further in the
multivariate analysis below, we draw two main conclusions from these patterns here.  First, given
these raw correlations, patterns of measured discrimination are not likely to be able to explain
patterns of reported gender-induced harm across age groups.  Second, the much weaker age
pattern in unemployment than wage gaps suggests the following interpretation of our evidence: 
compared to men of their own age, young women face a more favorable wage distribution than
older women, and take advantage of this by raising their reservation wages in searching for both
their pre- and post-separation jobs.  This is further justification for our treatment, in this paper, of
both post- and pre-separation wage levels as outcomes of the general level of demand, supply
and discrimination conditions in labor markets for workers in a given age group. 
To get a more formal idea of the ability of measured discrimination to explain the age
pattern of reported discrimination, we estimate probit models analogous to those presented in
Table 3 adding controls for “observed” discrimination.   Panels A and B of Table 5 present the
estimates of various specifications of the probits of hurtful discrimination when discrimination is
calculated for postseparation wages using the measures  and  , respectively.  The following
results are of note.  As in Table 3, the age coefficient again fluctuates in significance but remains
negative, and of roughly the same magnitude no matter what the specification.   Additionally,







 Similar results are also found when discrimination in reported reservation wages, or wage changes are used
13
in these regressions
The one exception noted above likely results from collinearity between personal characteristics and measured
14
discrimination, which becomes substantial when the list of covariates  comes close to exhausting the list of X variables
used to calculate the  measures. 
reports.  Finally, it is worth noting the absence of a robust relationship between measured
discrimination and women's survey reports of discrimination.  The   coefficients in Panels A
and B in Table 5 are often negative, and in all cases but one are highly insignificant, further
supporting the notion that measured discrimination is of little help in explaining patterns of
reported discrimination across age groups, or across individuals. 
Table 6 assesses the robustness of the results in Panel A and B in Table 5 by presenting
age coefficients from probits analogous to those in Table 5, but when “objective” discrimination
is measured, alternatively, using preseparation wages and unemployment durations.   As can be
13
seen, the age coefficients found in Table 6 display the same general patterns as those found in
Panels A and B in Table 5, although the patterns are weaker for unemployment spells.    Further,
percent female in occupation once again remains a negative and significant influence on reports. 
(There is an exception when unemployment duration discrimination is calculated using  .)
Thus, the results found in Panels A and B in Table 5 seem to be robust.   
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One final, potential concern with our result in this section is “omitted experience bias”.  
In particular, because our measures of labor market experience are limited to age, education and
tenure on the preseparation job, unobserved differences in labor market experience between men
and women are likely to exist.  More importantly, they are likely to be greater among older than
younger individuals, suggesting that our estimates of measured discrimination may be biased13
 The COEP does contain information on whether a respondent had income from wages in any of the five
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years preceding the survey.   Using this information, we constructed a “partial” measure of actual labor market
experience equal to the number of years in the past five in which they had income from wages.  All “partial” labor
market experience results are available from the authors upon request.
upward for older women. 
While “omitted experience bias” may be an important issue in the precise quantification
of gender-wage gap measures, it can explain the higher levels of reported gender-induced harm
among young women in our sample only if it is severe enough to reverse the observed positive
correlation between measured discrimination and age.  We feel this is highly unlikely for the
following reasons:  First, because labor market experience cannot differ greatly among young
workers, measured discrimination among the youngest cohort in our sample is unlikely to be
affected by omitted experience bias.  This is the smallest amount of discrimination for any age
group in our sample (see Table 4), and “true” discrimination faced by older women would have
to be lower than this measure if omitted experience bias explains our results.  Second, when we
include a measure of “partial” labor market experience as an additional underlying determinant 
of measured discrimination, the magnitude and significance levels of the age coefficients
presented in Tables 5 and 6 are virtually unchanged.    
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Third, unlike our data, the 1985 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) does collect
information on total labor market experience.  When we analysed age patterns of measured wage
discrimination in this data set, we found that controlling for actual labor market experience does
not reverse the positive correlation between measured discrimination and age.  In particular, the
PSID asked the following questions of household “heads” and their “wives”:  “How many years
altogether have you worked for money since you were 18?” and “How many of these years did14
Full-time experience is equal to the number of years the respondent reported working full-time since the age
16
18.  Part-time experience is equal to the total number of years the respondent reported working since the age 18 minus
the number  of years of full-time experience.  Finally, time out of the labor force is equal to the number of years the
individual was out of the labor force since they graduated from school. 
Interestingly, we find that time out of the labor force has a negative and significant effect on the wages of
17
women, but not of men.  Further, men receive a higher return to each additional year of both full-time and part-time
experience than women. In fact, women do not receive a wage premium for part-time work experience.  All the
remaining coefficients have the expected sign and are available from the authors upon request. 
you work full-time for most or all of the year?”  Using this information we are able to construct a
measure of full-time experience, part-experience, and time out of the labor force.   We then re-
16
estimate the log wage regressions given by equations (1) and (2), where the following variables
are included in the X ’s: years of  education, full time experience, full time experience squared, ij
part time experience, part time experience squared, years out of the labor force, marital status,
number of children, racial dummy variables, and state dummy variables.    As before, we use the
17
estimated coefficients from equations (1) and (2) to compute two alternative individual-specific
measures of discrimination against women given by equation (3) and (4).
In Appendix I, we present unadjusted means of log wages, and of individual-specific
discrimination measures based on log wages, for women in different age categories using the
1985 PSID.  As in Table 4, there is a similarity of the patterns in the unadjusted versus the
regression-adjusted wage gaps.  Further, measured discrimination is lower among younger
workers than among older workers despite the inclusion of actual labor market experience as an
additional determinant of measured discrimination.
The final and most important reason why omitted experience bias cannot explain our
results is the evidence we present in the next section, that like gender-induced harm, survey
reports of gender-induced advantage are also more common among young women.  This is very15
Interestingly, men's reporting patterns across education groups are however much stronger than women's,
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but of a similar nature to women's reporting patterns across age groups: Highly-educated men are much more likely to
say they were hurt by discrimination, and more likely to say they were helped by discrimination, than less-educated men.
We view this as a useful topic for further research.  
hard to explain with a story based only on higher unmeasured discrimination faced by young
women; clearly a more complex explanation than omitted experience alone is required. 
    We conclude the following from the analysis in this section.  First, observable
characteristics of the women in our sample are unable to account for the observed effect of age
on reported discrimination.  Second, no standard measure of  “objective” discrimination can
explain the more frequent reports of hurtful discrimination made by younger women in our
sample either.   
IV.  Broadening the analysis: Gender-induced advantage, and men’s perceptions.
In this section we broaden our analysis by examining women’s reports of gender-induced
advantage in the labor market, as well as men’s reports of gender-induced advantage and harm. 
The main goal is to ask whether this additional information can shed any more light on young
women's much greater propensity to report gender-induced harm.  We  begin our analysis in
Table 7, which presents means of these additional indicators by age.  These means reveal what
were to us some very surprising patterns: First, like women, young men are also more likely to
feel that they have been hurt by gender discrimination than older men, though the relationship is
certainly not as strong as it is for women.   Further, young women, while more likely to report
18
gender-induced harm, are also more likely than other women to report that they benefitted from
being female.  Thus, especially for women, reports of both harm and advantage seem to move in








add together all those individuals who reported either harm or advantage.  In all cases, these
fractions fall with age, generally more strongly than reports of harm or advantage alone. 
In order to interpret these patterns, in this section we develop a framework of the decision
to report both gender-induced harm and advantage in a confidential survey.  An interesting
challenge for this framework arises from the fact that, while our dependent variable is clearly
ordered (one's gender either hurt, had no impact, or helped), a worker's age appears (at least in
our raw data) to have the effect of increasing the frequency of both “extreme” outcomes (“hurt”
and “helped”).  As most existing techniques for dealing with ordered data cannot fit such patterns
well we develop some simple models which are better suited to this purpose. 
(a) Conceptual Framework.
Assume that the net amount of favorable treatment, relative to the opposite sex, faced by
individual i in his or her job search is given by a scalar, .
(5)
where  is a normal error term with mean zero and variance  .  What we have in mind as
entering into )  includes longer or shorter unemployment spells relative to the opposite sex, i
differential treatment in job interviews, outright sexual harassment, and any other labor market
outcome differentials encountered by the individual (whether observed or unobserved by the
econometrician) relative to a similar person of the opposite sex.   To allow for reports of both


























For now, we assume a constant reporting threshold across individuals; in what follows we shall explicitly
19
model the dependence of this threshold on age.  Note also that, because ) has an intercept (see (8)), (6) does not i
constrain reports of harm and advantage to be equally frequent; instead the symmetry of (6) is meant to capture the
notion of individuals implicitly conducting two-tailed hypothesis tests about whether discrimination exists, which by




unaffected by her gender iff: 
where K is the threshold amount of differential treatment that induces reports of either harm (in
the lower tail of the distribution of )) or advantage (in the upper tail). i
19
Combining (5) and (6), an individual reports neither harm or advantage iff:
or 
where   is a standard normal variate.  In (8),  K =  2    - K, and K =  2 + K.   Reports of hurtful 10 2 0
and helpful discrimination are given by the obvious complementary expressions. 
The model in (8), as written, is a standard ordered probit equation with three ordered
responses.   As is well known,  , which in our model represents the standard deviation of
individuals’ experiences that is not associated with observed characteristics, is not identified; the
standard practice is to normalize it to one and interpret the coefficient estimates as relative to this 2/FN
K1/FN K2/FN
18
 An key method of assessing our models’ performance in this section involves comparing the predicted
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pattern of reports across age groups with the unadjusted means in Tables 2 and 7.  For that reason we represent age by
a set of four dummy variables, instead of a continuous variable, throughout this section. 
term, i.e. as estimates of  .  Note that this model also generates estimates of standardized
“cutoffs”, and .   
(b) Two Hypotheses; Three Models.
We now use (8) as a framework for testing two broad hypotheses that might explain the
greater propensity of both young men and women to report helpful and hurtful discrimination. 
The first of these is greater heterogeneity in the gender-related treatment experienced by the
young: large amounts of both hurtful and helpful discrimination may be more common among
the young, for example if the young find themselves in a much greater variety of jobs and work
situations than their parents.  
There are two main ways that this idea of “greater heterogeneity” might enter the model
in (8).  One is that young women could be endowed with a distribution of observed
characteristics (Z's) that generates more reports in both tails; to assess whether this kind of
heterogeneity can explain the pattern of reports in our data, we simply estimate (8) as it stands,
then ask whether (given the actual distribution of observed characteristics in our data) it can
successfully mimic the pattern of reports across age groups in the data.  In what follows, we shall
refer to this ordinary ordered probit as “Model 1".  
Maximum likelihood coefficient estimates for Model 1 are shown in column 1of Table 8
for women, and column 1 of Table 9 for men.   They show the following.  First, as in the
20
previous section, only a few observed characteristics (Z’s) have significant direct effects (2’s) onFN
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the total amount of net favorable treatment faced by individual women or men.  These include
the percent female in one’s occupation, marital status and education; they do not include age.  As
expected, high values of percent female in one’s occupation significantly increase (decrease) the
probability of reporting helpful (hurtful) discrimination for women.  Although not significant, the
reverse is true for men: thus both women and men are more likely to feel harmed when they find
themselves in a “minority” in their occupation.   Further, marital status also has opposite effects
on the underlying “net favorable treatment” index, ), for men and women, with the effect being
significant for women.  Compared to less than high school –the omitted category--, men’s
probability of reporting hurtful (helpful) discrimination is significantly higher (lower), at the two
highest levels of education (college and university).  The same is not true for women.  
Can Model 1 successfully explain the pattern of reported gender-induced harm and
advantage in our data?   To address this issue, the predicted pattern of reported discrimination
from the model across age groups is shown in part (a) of Table 10.  These predictions give the
mean predicted fraction of individuals in each age category reporting discrimination, with each
age category evaluated at its own mean characteristics, Z.  Thus they are directly comparable with
the sample means for these variables in Tables 2 and 7. Clearly, Model 1 cannot successfully
mimic the pattern of lower reports of both harm and advantage among younger women in our
data. 
A second way in which greater heterogeneity for the young could enter our model is
through unobserved factors rather than observed ones, i.e. through a higher level of  .  To








where the A   are dummies for each of the age groups in the sample.  It is then easy to see how k
age, working through the F , can increase reports in both tails of the distribution.  Again, while N
the relative variance terms for different age groups, i.e. the b , are identified, the overall k
“baseline” variance is not; we thus set   equal to one and interpret the b  accordingly.  To the k
extent the estimated variance of unobserved differential treatment declines with age, and that this
model successfully mimics the pattern of reported discrimination across age groups in the raw
data, we can conclude that a possible cause of the greater reports of hurtful discrimination among
young women is greater unobserved heterogeneity in the labor market experiences of such
women.  
Coefficient estimates for Model 2 are shown in column 2 of Tables 8 and 9; for the most
part all the observed covariates (Z) have coefficients of similar size and significance compared to
column 1 of Tables 8 and 9.  Concerning the variance parameters (b), we find that the estimated
variance of unobserved evidence decreases as we move “up” the age categories, beginning with
the omitted category (age 15-24).  The standard deviation is significantly higher among the
youngest age group, compared to the oldest.   Further, as Table 10 shows, Model 2  is also much
better at mimicking the patterns of reported discrimination across age groups for both men and
women in our data.  Overall, we take our estimates of Models 1 and 2 together as mixed support
for the “heterogeneity” hypothesis, because if the experiences of the young really are more
heterogeneous, we would expect at least some of this to be captured by their observedFN
FN
FN










To see that these “unobserved heterogeneity” and “differences in thresholds” models have different empirical
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implications, consider the effect of    and K  on the left hand side of (8), which determines the fraction of individuals 1
reporting “helpful” discrimination.  An age-related change in  changes the sensitivity of the left hand side to the
observed covariates, Z.  An age-related change in K  does not.   1 
characteristics in Model 1.  Given this mixed message, we now turn to a final hypothesis.  
The final hypothesis we consider in this paper involves not a difference in the “actual”
labor market experiences of the young and old, but a difference in how their experiences are
translated into survey reports of harm or advantage.  In particular, we now ask what happens
when we hold  constant, but let the amount of departure from gender neutrality, K, which
induces reports of hurtful or helpful discrimination, vary across age groups.  Noting from (7) and




The idea is, in a sense, that younger women (and perhaps younger men) are less “tolerant” of (or
more sensitive to) departures from gender neutrality, in the sense that these are more likely to
induce reports of harm or advantage, than older people.  It is worth noting that this notion is, at
least in principle, empirically distinguishable from the previous version of the model where
unobserved heterogeneity,   varied across age groups;   thus we estimate Model 3 as well, and
2122
A negative d , for example, reduces the lower threshold (thus reducing reports of hurtful discrimination)
22
1
while at the same time increasing the upper threshold and reducing reports of “helpful” discrimination.  
ask how well it can mimic actual patterns of reported discrimination in the data.  
Coefficient estimates from Model 3 are shown in column 3 of Tables 8 and 9.  As we
might expect, the estimated cutoffs for reporting harm or advantage move farther apart as we
move up the age ladder.   And, as part (c) of Table 10 shows, Model 3 –like Model 2-- does a
22
successful job of  reproducing the pattern of increasing reports in both tails found among young
women and men in the raw data.  Indeed, while there are some subtle conceptual differences
between Models 2 and 3, both yield essentially the same maximized value of the log likelihood
function, and (because they have the same number of parameters as well) are essentially
indistinguishable statistically.  On the other hand, testing Model 1, which has four fewer
parameters, against Model 3 yields a LR test statistic for women of 15.15 with a p-value of
0.004; for men of 8.93 with a p-value of 0.063.   Similar test results are obtained when Model 2 
is used as the unrestricted model; thus both models are preferred to the simple ordered probit
specification of Model 1.  
Conceptually, both greater heterogeneity in the experiences of young people and less
“tolerance” of departures from gender-neutrality among the young could of course explain the
greater tendency of young men and young women to report both hurtful and helpful
discrimination in our data.  In this section, however, we have shown two things.  First, if it is
differences in the amount of heterogeneity that matters, it must be heterogeneity that is not
captured by any of the independent variables in our data set, i.e. what we call heterogeneity on
unobserved dimensions.  Second, a model which allows for differentials in either unobserved23
heterogeneity, or in reporting thresholds, across age groups is statistically preferred for both
women and men to one which does not. Overall, since we expect the broad idea of
“heterogeneity” to be at least partially captured by observable characteristics, and because we
rejected a number of other possible competing explanations in Section III of the paper, we are led
to conclude that a difference in reporting behavior --of the very particular kind formalized in
Model 3-- offers the most parsimonious and effective explanation of  the pattern of reported
harm and advantage across age groups in our data. 
V. Conclusions.
Virtually all the standard “objective” measures of discrimination computed by
economists, including unadjusted or residual wage gaps, and unadjusted or residual gaps in
unemployment durations, tend to be higher among older than younger women.  Whether this
represents true age effects or a difference across cohorts remains an open question, but it is clear
that, among women in the labor market today, discrimination as we usually measure it is much
more prevalent among older women.  At the same time, and perhaps paradoxically, younger
women are much more likely than older women to report, in confidential surveys, that they have
suffered from sex discrimination, or experienced gender-induced harm in the labor market.  This
lack of correspondence between the two measures, in our view, should raise serious questions
about whether “objective” measures really capture what most women really see as discriminatory
treatment in labor markets today.  
This paper has attempted to resolve the apparent inconsistency between age patterns of
reported and measured discrimination using a new data set on Canadian job seekers.  In addition24
to information on a variety of “objective” labor market outcomes and on women’s perceptions of
gender-induced harm, this data contains information on women’s perceptions of gender-induced
advantage, and on men’s perceptions of harm, which to our knowledge have not been examined
before.  We find, first of all, that young women’s more frequent reports of gender-induced harm
cannot be statistically attributed to any observable differences between them and older women,
including the presence of children and degree of occupational segregation.  Interestingly, we do
find that minority status in an occupation increases reports of gender-induced harm among both
women and men.  However, as minority status is not correlated with age in our data, this does not
help explain the age pattern of reports.  
Second, as expected, young women’s more frequent reports of harm also cannot be
attributed to a higher level of “objectively” measured discrimination: such measures are
uniformly lower for young women in our data.   More generally, even a higher level of
unmeasured discrimination cannot explain this phenomenon because it is inconsistent with the
more frequent reports of gender-induced harm among young men, or advantage among young
women, that we also see  in our data.  
In the paper we identify two further hypotheses that are potentially consistent with what
we observe.  One of these --greater dispersion in the labor market experiences of young workers-
- receives mixed support.  The other --a particular kind of change in reporting behavior-- is more
immediately consistent with our data, and is our preferred explanation for the patterns observed.  
According to this interpretation, young workers of both sexes are simply more willing than older
workers to interpret departures in either direction from gender-neutral treatment as causally
related to their gender. 25
Overall, our conclusion that the principal cause of more frequent reports of gender-
induced harm among young women is a difference in reporting is an optimistic one: it is not
young women’s “objective” circumstances that are worse, but simply the standards by which
these circumstances are judged that are different.  Whether young peoples’ standards, in any
sense, are more or less “correct” is a question to which we have no answer, but in either case
these different standards may have interesting policy implications.  For example, if lower
“tolerance” of non-gender-neutral treatment remains a permanent attribute of today’s cohort of
young workers, designers of future antidiscrimination policies face a dilemma: while the young
are less tolerant of discrimination, they also appear to be less tolerant of reverse discrimination. 
Creating policies that address the former problem without creating perceptions of the latter may
thus become increasingly difficult in coming decades. 26
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Table 1: Sample Mean Characteristics
Men Women
Mean (Std. Error) Mean (Std. Error)
Age 36.65 (0.23) 37.41 (0.27)
Education Variables:
Less than High School 0.34 (0.01) 0.25 (0.01)
High School 0.31 (0.01) 0.32 (0.01)
Some College or 0.14 (0.01) 0.13 (0.01)
University
College 0.12 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01)
University 0.10 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01)
Marital Status:
Married 0.61 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01)
Separated/ 0.08 (0.01) 0.12 (0.01)
Divorced/
Widowed
Single 0.31 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01)
Children less than 6 0.28 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01)
percent female in occupation 0.25 (0.00) 0.55 (0.01)
tenure (weeks) 230.53 (7.79) 219.79 (7.19)
pre-separation hourly wage 15.72 (0.16) 10.09 (0.13)
post-separation hourly wage 16.37 (0.19) 10.06 (0.16)
Unemployment Spell (weeks) 20.70 (0.44) 23.84 (0.68)
1
Discrimination Measures:
Hurt 0.06 (0.00) 0.10 (0.01)
Help 0.05 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Number of Observations 2280 1586
2
Notes:  1. Includes incomplete spells.  2. Due to missing data, the number of observations is lower for
some variables.28









Note: Exact binomial standard errors in parentheses.29
Table 3: Probit Coefficients for Gender-Induced Harm, Various
Specifications
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Age -.0134 -.0138 -.0115 -.0112 -.0106
(3.20) (3.15) (2.05) (1.99) (1.85)
High School -.0142 .0098 -.0171 .0151
(0.12) (0.08) (0.14) (0.12)
Some College/ -.1490 -.1758 -.1807 -.1173
University (0.95) (1.09) (1.10) (0.71)
College Degree -.1387 -.1442 -.1251 -.0445
(0.93) (0.95) (0.81) (0.28)
University .1932 .1953 .1747 .2472
Degree (1.38) (1.36) (1.19) (1.64)
Married -.2465 -.2186 -.2270
(2.17) (1.89) (1.96)
Separated, Div- .1366 .1494 .1224
orced, Widowed (0.85) (0.92) (0.75)
Children under 6 -.0396 -.0472 -.0409
(0.45) (0.52) (0.45)




Province no no no yes yes
dummies
Number of obs. 1548 1519 1473 1471 1466








Table 4: Selected Measures of “Objective” Discrimination, by age group
                                        Measured Discrimination: Various Outcome Measures
      Preseparation Wages         Postseparation Wages      Unemployment Durations
unadjusted adjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted adjusted
gap gap ( ) gap ( ) gap gap ( ) gap ( ) gap gap ( ) gap ( )
1
Age: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
55-64 0.568 0.738 0.602 0.66 0.831 0.678 0.358 0.976 0.377
45-54 0.575 0.564 0.556 0.609 0.633 0.615 0.392 0.551 0.292
35-44 0.504 0.438 0.494 0.546 0.493 0.553 0.468 0.608 0.317
25-34 0.372 0.34 0.377 0.423 0.403 0.434 0.171 0.476 0.28
15-24 0.259 0.45 0.321 0.373 0.504 0.405 0.071 0.791 0.031
Female unemployment duration minus male.  Censoring adjusted for using a censored normal regression model of log spell duration
1












Table 5: Probit Coefficients for Gender-Induced Harm, Controlling for
“Objective” Discrimination on the Postseparation Job       
Panel A
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Age -.0182 -.0202 -.0155 -.0144 -.0146
(3.12) (3.33) (2.09) (1.92) (1.92)
-.0031 .0100 .0397 -.0024 -.0086
(0.02) (0.08) (0.32) (0.02) (0.07)
percent female -.5808
in occupation (2.11)
education no yes yes yes yes
demographics no no yes yes yes
province no no no yes yes
Number of obs. 927 927 927 908 907
Panel B
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Age -.0116 -.0157 -.0216 -.0112 -.0106
(2.37) (2.78) (2.99) (1.99) (1.85)





education no yes yes yes yes
demographics no no yes yes yes
province no no no yes yes
Number of obs. 1471 1471 1471 1471 1466
Notes:  1. In these tables   was calculated for all workers --even those without postseparation jobs–
from the postseparation log wage regressions.  Very similar results are obtained if the sample is restricted
to those with post-separation jobs.  2. We exclude   from the estimating equation because  is a linear







Table 6: Probit Coefficients of Gender-Induced Harm on Age, Controlling for
Discrimination in Other Dimensions
Observed Preseparation Wage Unemployment Spell
characteristics
controlled for:
[1] [2] [3] [4]
 only -.0123 -.0104 -.0317 -.0136
(2.65) (2.13) (2.60) (1.70)
education -.0135 -.0118 -.0366 -.0138
(2.83) (2.26) (2.85) (1.69)
education, -.0122 -.0182 -.0287 -.0113
demographics (2.05) (2.44) (1.86) (1.05)
education, demo- -.0116 -.0112 -.0372 -.0181
graphics, province (1.93) (1.99) (2.25) (1.55)
education, demo- -.0107 -.0106 -.0421 -.0184
graphics, province,  (1.77) (1.86) (2.38) (1.58)
percent female in
occupation
“femocc” -.7286 -.5550 -1.450 -.5863
coefficient in (3.33) (2.65) (2.24) (1.48)
above
Note:   Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 33
Table 7: Frequency of other aspects of reported discrimination, by age group
               Women                                    Men
Age Help Hurt+Help Hurt Help Hurt+Help
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
55-64 0.011 0.053 0.045 0.038 0.083
45-54 0.034 0.122 0.042 0.030 0.071
35-44 0.027 0.120 0.058 0.063 0.122
25-34 0.051 0.174 0.061 0.050 0.111
< 25 0.064 0.195 0.067 0.058 0.12534
Table 8: Ordered Probit Models of Gender-Induced Harm and Advantage: 
Women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age  25-34 -.0982 (0.78) -.0956 (0.82) -.1236 (0.99)
Age  35-44 -.0945 (0.72) -.1162 (0.97) -.1859 (1.38)
Age  45-54 -.0360 (0.24) -.0508 (0.38) -.1009 (0.67)
Age 55-64 .0010 (0.01) -.0780 (0.41) -.1983 (0.74)
Education :
       high school -.0789 (0.76) -.0832 (0.92) -.0833 (0.79)
      some college or       .0821 (0.62) .0557 (0.48) .0777 (0.58)
          university
      college degree .1377 (1.09) .1169 (1.05) .1349 (1.05)
     university degree -.0842 (0.65) -.1149 (1.02) -.0992 (0.76)
Married .1970 (1.99) .1725 (1.97) .1934 (1.97)
Separated/divorced/ .0463 (0.33) .0083 (0.07) .0206 (0.15)
widowed
Children less than 6 .0118 (0.16) .0215 (0.33) .0141 (0.19)
Tenure (ROE job) .0000 (0.14) .0000 (0.28) .0000 (0.16)
Percent female in .4385 (2.57) .4087 (2.73) .4612 (2.66)
occupation
c -1.10 (6.87) -.9704 (6.32) -.9680 (5.70) 1
c 1.99 (11.72) 1.71 (9.22) 1.75 (9.09) 2
d n/a n/a -.0849 (0.79) 2
d n/a n/a -.2988 (2.66) 3
d n/a n/a -.2428 (2.02) 4
d n/a n/a -.6352 (2.66) 5
b n/a -.0649 (0.87) n/a 2
b n/a -.2013 (3.17) n/a 3
b n/a -.1747 (2.48) n/a 4
b n/a -.3219 (3.61) n/a 5
Log likelihood -705.71 -697.44  -698.13
Notes: 1. 1466 observations in all three models.  2. Province dummies were included in all three models. 
3. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 35
Table 9: Ordered Probit Models of Gender-Induced Harm and Advantage:
Men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age  25-34 .0636 (0.56) .0575 (0.53) .0588 (0.53)
Age  35-44 .0940 (0.75) .0819 (0.68) .0852 (0.70)
Age  45-54 -.0172 (0.12) -.0322 (0.24) -.0420 (0.29)
Age 55-64 .0389 (0.22) .0320 (0.19) .0349 (0.19)
Education :
       high school -.1799 (2.04) -.1815 (2.13) -.1875 (2.11)
      some college or       -.1286 (1.13) -.1367 (1.25) -.1375 (1.21)
                university
      college degree -.2341 (1.96) -.2254 (1.96) -.2353 (1.97)
     university degree -.2741 (2.12) -.2940 (2.35) -.2908 (2.23)
Married -.0320 (0.34) -.0215 (0.24) -.0283 (0.30)
Separated/divorced/ -.1038 (0.71) -.1081 (0.77) -.1078 (0.72)
widowed
Children less than 6 .0000 (0.00) -.0042 (0.07) -.0016 (0.03)
Tenure (ROE job) .0000 (0.60) -.0001 (0.70) -.0001 (0.65)
Percent female in -.2672 (1.69) -.2617 (1.73) -.2702 (1.70)
occupation 
c -1.76 (13.14) -1.70 (11.51) -1.70 (11.51) 1
c 1.57 (11.89) 1.47 (10.04) 1.48 (9.76) 2
d n/a n/a -.0515 (0.54) 2
d n/a n/a -.0117 (0.12) 3
d n/a n/a -.2860 (2.39) 4
d n/a n/a -.1862 (1.21) 5
b n/a -.0358 (0.61) n/a 2
b n/a -.0051 (0.08) n/a 3
b n/a -.1578 (2.65) n/a 4
b n/a -.1173 (1.43) n/a 5
Log likelihood -805.14 -800.45 -800.68
Notes:  1. 2057 observations in all three models.  2. Province dummies were included in all three models. 
3. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.36
Table 10: Predictions of Gender-Induced Harm and Advantage by Age
Category:  Alternative Models
(a) Model 1: Fixed Cutoffs and Variance
Gender Age Category Hurt No Impact Help
Females 55-64 0.085 0.867 0.047
45-54 0.095 0.862 0.043
35-44 0.106 0.855 0.039
25-34 0.108 0.854 0.038
<25 0.112 0.852 0.035
Males 55-64 0.051 0.897 0.052
45-54 0.056 0.899 0.045
35-44 0.047 0.899 0.055
25-34 0.050 0.899 0.050
<25 0.055 0.900 0.046
(b) Model 2: Variance varies with Age
Gender Age Category Hurt No Impact Help
Females 55-64 0.051 0.935 0.014
45-54 0.087 0.878 0.036
35-44 0.093 0.880 0.027
25-34 0.122 0.826 0.051
<25 0.140 0.799 0.061
Males 55-64 0.039 0.921 0.041
45-54 0.038 0.935 0.028
35-44 0.054 0.884 0.062
25-34 0.053 0.895 0.052
<25 0.063 0.883 0.054
(c) Model 3: Cutoffs vary symmetrically with Age
Gender Age Category Hurt No Impact Help
Females 55-64 0.048 0.940 0.012
45-54 0.089 0.874 0.037
35-44 0.094 0.878 0.028
25-34 0.121 0.829 0.050
<25 0.138 0.803 0.059
Males 55-64 0.040 0.918 0.042
45-54 0.038 0.935 0.027
35-44 0.054 0.885 0.062
25-34 0.053 0.894 0.053
<25 0.063 0.883 0.054ˆ D
1 ˆ D
2
Appendix I:  “Objective” Wage Discrimination, by age group: Estimates from
the 1985 Panel Survey of Income Dynamics 
                                        Measured Discrimination
       Log Wages
unadjusted gap adjusted gap ( ) adjusted gap ( )
Age: [1] [2] [3]
55-64 0.519 0.465 0.499
45-54 0.594 0.455 0.42
35-44 0.465 0.34 0.334
25-34 0.326 0.233 0.258
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